Book Review: God, Evolution, and Animal Suffering by Strickland, Lloyd
1 
 
Bethany N. Sollereder, God, Evolution, and Animal Suffering: Theodicy Without a Fall 
(New York: Routledge, 2019). Pp. 206.  $140.00 (Hbk). ISBN 9781138608474. 
 
For almost as long as Christian thinkers have been vexed by the problem of evil, their 
attention has scarcely wavered from human pain and suffering and how to square this with an 
all-powerful, all-knowing, all-loving God. Only in the last few decades has the problem 
posed by animal suffering been given any meaningful consideration, and this has resulted in a 
spate of recent books and articles on the topic, most notably Michael Murray’s Nature Red in 
Tooth and Claw (2008), Christopher Southgate’s Groaning of Creation (2008), and Elizabeth 
Johnson’s Ask the Beasts: Darwin and the God of Love (2014). To these we may now add 
Sollereder’s God, Evolution, and Animal Suffering, which benefits enormously from the work 
of these (and other) pioneers without being beholden to any particular one. 
 With regard to animal suffering, Sollereder’s book contains both a negative and a 
positive thesis. The negative thesis, the subject of chapter 2, is that the commonly held view 
that a fall disrupted or corrupted God’s peaceful creation by introducing violence, death, and 
suffering, is mistaken. While Sollereder accepts a human and satanic fall, she rejects a cosmic 
fall, that is, a corruption of the whole created order due to (but not directly caused by) the 
human or satanic fall (14). To those who suggest that suffering found its way into creation 
due to some kind of oppositional force, whether chaos or satanic, she points to the numerous 
scriptural passages which state that the world and all that is in it is God’s handiwork and 
under his dominion. And to those who suggest that the world was corrupted by the curse of 
the ground mentioned in Genesis 3, she argues, through deft lexical analysis, that the curse 
was lifted following the flood recorded in Genesis 8, and that therefore ‘One cannot look here 
[sc. to God’s cursing of the ground in Genesis 3] for an explanation of the abundant suffering 
of the non-human world’ (30). 
Sollereder’s positive thesis is developed in chapters 4, 5 and 6. Following in the 
footsteps of Murray and Southgate, Sollereder insists that only a compound model will 
succeed in addressing non-human suffering. The key elements of Sollereder’s compound are 
these: 
 
1. God’s love of his creation 
2. God’s presence in the world, as co-sufferer and shaper of meaning 
3. Universal redemption 
 
The idea that God loves his creation is a familiar one, but Sollereder – like Southgate before 
her – sees it as the key to understanding God’s decision to create a world driven by 
evolutionary processes, with all of the suffering that entails. After all, as Sollereder notes, 
true love precludes one having complete control over the beloved, though it does allow for 
direction, encouragement, and persuasion, all methods she thinks God uses in preference to 
direct control or manipulation (94). At the heart of this claim is a version of kenotic theology, 
according to which God voluntarily self-limits himself in various ways in order to allow his 
creation to develop freely, independently of his will. Drawing on the work of Polkinghorne 
and Southgate, Sollereder claims that God opts to create a world that creates itself, a world in 
which creatures have some autonomy in working out their own survival, autonomy which 
contributes to the evolutionary process. She stresses that it was God’s choice to grant this 
autonomy rather than the result of any essential lack of power on God’s part, as process 
theologians maintain. 
 The second element of Sollereder’s model considers God’s activity and presence in 
the world. Key here is the claim that God accompanies every creature in every moment of its 
existence and is thus their companion in suffering, a familiar motif in recent attempts by 
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theologians to address animal suffering, for example in the works by Southgate and Johnson 
mentioned above. Sollereder also envisages God as ‘active in shaping the meaning of events’ 
(144), and thus cautions against our supposing that the meaning of any event is already fixed, 
whether to us or to God, as he will seek to craft new meanings as creation unfolds. 
Accordingly, we should not suppose that the story of the world and the animal suffering 
therein is ready to be told in its final form, as God has not yet finished it. 
 This leads to the third element of Sollereder’s model, namely the completion of God’s 
creative activity through redemption, which she construes not merely in terms of renewal but 
in terms of a transformation of individual creatures into something far greater than they were 
in this life. While it has become commonplace for those tackling the problem of animal 
suffering to appeal to redemption at the eschaton, some, such as Southgate, restrict it to 
sentient creatures only. Meanwhile, others, such as Johnson, conceive it as extending to all 
creatures, and Sollereder follows suit, arguing that as God loves each creature individually, 
he will redeem each and every one: ‘The scope of redemption is universal because a universal 
redemption is required by the ubiquitous love of God’ (163). While she allows that 
redemption will heal the suffering of animals, she is at pains to stress that it should not be 
considered as compensation for this suffering, but rather as the fullest expression of God’s 
love, which transforms all the world’s evil, harm, and disvalue ‘into the love, harmony, and 
diversity of the kingdom of God’ (178).  
As should be clear from the foregoing, Sollereder’s model leans heavily on ideas 
formulated and developed by a number of others working in the same field. This is not to 
suggest that there is nothing original in her model, however. Once one dives into the detail 
one finds much that is novel, such as her construal of redemption in terms of fractal mosaics, 
in which individual creatures are thought of as forming a picture from which one can zoom 
out (as it were) to a broader picture which captures the relationships between creatures and 
from which one can zoom out still further to see the picture of the interaction of these 
relationships. According to Sollereder, all of these fractal mosaics are disassembled at the end 
of time, and from them all God forms a new, harmonious picture, at the point of the 
resurrection (166-7). 
 While Sollereder’s book will (deservedly) attract much attention for the impressively 
detailed model it contains, it might also serve to open a debate about the nature of theodicy 
itself. The subtitle of the book – Theodicy Without a Fall – would lead one to suspect that 
Sollereder intends her model as a theodicy, yet in the introduction she describes the book as 
‘an exploration of theology relating to suffering and creation, rather than a traditional 
theodicy or defence’ (3). In the same vein, a little later in the introduction she claims that her 
‘overall goal is not to defend or justify God against attacks, but to paint a picture of God and 
the world that incorporates the suffering and the joy, the death and the life, the loss and the 
redemption that is revealed through investigation of the natural world and the Christian story’ 
(10). So does Sollereder intend her model as a theodicy or not? The evidence is mixed 
throughout. For example, in chapter 3, a lengthy and illuminating survey of other thinkers’ 
attempts to square animal suffering with the existence of God, Sollereder depicts the project 
of theodicy in stark terms as an enterprise shorn of theological commitments (57), which 
contrasts sharply with her own approach, drawing heavily as it does upon resources from 
systematic theology and biblical studies and very little from philosophy. Further on in the 
book she again draws a clear distinction between her approach and that of traditional theodicy 
(93), yet this does not prevent her from occasionally describing her model as a theodicy (e.g. 
183). Sollereder’s vacillation is no doubt due to the fact that since Leibniz first coined the 
term, a theodicy has typically been thought of a philosophical justification of God in the face 
of the world’s evil, a description that, by Sollereder’s own admission, does not obviously 
apply to her model. Yet her model contains a more plausible justification than many of those 
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offered heretofore, not in spite of the fact that it is rooted much more deeply in theology than 
in philosophy but arguably because of it. Therefore, what Sollereder shows, perhaps 
inadvertently, is that the project of theodicy stands a better chance of thriving as part of a 
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